The defendant-appellant as landlord (to be referred to simply as the defendant) had judgment against the plaintiff-respondent as tenant (hereafter referred to as the plaintiff) for the recovery of arrears of rent for the sum of ¢11.00 plus costs of ¢5.00. This judgment dated 18 April 1969 is marked exhibit B. Subsequently on 26 September 1969 defendant applied to the registrar of the court as deputy sheriff for a writ of fi. fa. to levy execution for the amount of ¢16. On 15 October 1969 the registrar issued the fi. fa. for a total sum of ¢18.50; the additional ¢2.50 representing the cost of the writ. On 16 October 1969 the plaintiff made part payment of ¢9.00 to the registrar and the fi. fa. was eventually executed for the balance of ¢9.50. Pursuant to the fi. Fa. bailiff on 21 October 1969 removed some personal effects of the plaintiff from his dwelling-house in execution and lodged them with the auctioneer for sale. No sale, however, took place because before [p.235] the lapse of the seven days' statutory period after seizure, the plaintiff paid the accrued sum which on account of other charges, was ¢14.50, and collected his goods from the auctioneer.
The point is agreed that during the trial and before the judgment, exhibit B, the plaintiff paid ¢7.00 as part payment of the claim for the two months' arrears of rent as evidenced by the receipt, exhibit A. Therefore when on 16 October 1969 he paid the sum of ¢9.00, the judgment debt of ¢16.00 was extinguished. Consequently he maintained that the execution of 21 October 1969 was wrongful as there was no judgment debt outstanding. It was upon this grievance that the plaintiff brought an action for damages for wrongful seizure of his personal effects against the defendant and the auctioneer. The trial magistrate dismissed the action against the auctioneer on the ground of his having acted in good faith, and found against the defendant, awarding against him damages of ¢200.00 of which ¢13.50 represented special damages together with costs of ¢14.00. The action against the two defendants lay in trespass, and if indeed the second defendant was proved to have seized or taken the goods of the plaintiff into his house without lawful justification, good faith is no defence. But that is beside the point of the appeal, which is against the decision that the first defendant was liable in damages for trespass.
The three additional grounds argued were:
"(1) The trial magistrate made findings in his judgment which
