OPARE YEBOAH & 8 ORS v. BARCLAYS BANK GHANA LIMITED

WOOD (MRS), CJ:-

The salient facts leading to the institution of the action, from which this appeal culminates, are indeed quite simple. The 1st-8th appellants worked at various branches of the respondent bank as employees; and served also as local union executives of the 9th appellants, the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union. On the 26th February, 2008, the respondent bank, purportedly acting under article 17 of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between themselves and their employees, issued out letters to the 1st – 8th appellants, dismissing them retrospectively from their employment, that is, from the 11th January, 2008, the date on which the respondent put them on notice of summary dismissal; viz, notice of the bank’s intention to dismiss them without pay in lieu of notice. The respondents’ action was triggered by an alleged illegal activity instigated by the 1st -8th appellants, working in concert with others, on the 14th of November, 2007. The alleged actions as particularised in letters notifying them of the respondent’s intention of summary dismissal, and which notices were served on them prior to the actual letters of dismissal, were that the appellants “did declare, instigate, incite, lead and or support others to resort to an illegal action in complete contravention of the Labour Act 2003, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the respondent bank and its employees.”

Not surprisingly, the respondents who disputed the charges, on receipt of the notices, on 22nd January 2008, instituted an action challenging their legality. However, both the court of first instance and Court of Appeal, which determined the action and appeal respectively, in well reasoned and well thought out decisions, found against the appellants. The end result is this appeal which is based on the following grounds:

(1) The learned justices of the Court of Appeal erred when they held that articles 15 and 17 of the collective bargaining agreement between the parties were separate and that there was no obligation on the defendant to proceed under article 15 before invoking article 17.

(2) The learned justices of the Court of Appeal erred when they held that the defendant bank had an unlimited discretion to invoke either article 15 or 17 or both on the facts and circumstances of any given situation and that the defendant bank properly invoked article 17 in the instant case.

(3) The learned justices of the Court of Appeal erred when they held that th