NII ODAI AYIKU IV v. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL & ANOTHER

OWUSU (MS), JSC:-

This appeal touches on the Jurisdiction of the High Court with regard to the reliefs claimed by the Plaintiff/Appellant/Appellant on his writ of summons issued on 2nd day of March 2001.

By the writ of summons the plaintiff who described himself in the statement of claim as the “Mantse” of Nungua in the Ga Traditional Area, sought the following declarations –

(i) “That E. I. 18” Nungua Chieftaincy Affairs (Nii Odai Ayiku IV) (prohibition) Instrument 1983 E. I. 18 is null and void having been based on facts which are untrue.”

(ii) That E. I. 18 cannot operate to “destool” the plaintiff without judicial process

(iii) That notwithstanding E. I. 18 the plaintiff is the lawfully enstooled Mantse of Nungua and entitled to exercise the functions appertaining to that status.”

The original Defendant was the Attorney-General representing the Republic of Ghana.

By a search conducted, it was revealed that even though the Attorney-General was served on 08-03-2001, he failed to enter appearance as at 3rd May 2001. Thereafter, the plaintiff on 07-05-2001 filed an application for Judgment in Default of Appearance.

On 10th May, 2001 the application was heard and granted by Ebiasah J. This is exactly what his Lordship said:

“Judgment is hereby entered for the plaintiff/applicant against the defendant for all the reliefs stated on his writ.”

Subsequently, all attempts made by the Attorney-General to have the default Judgment set aside failed. The present Respondent, who described himself as the current chief or Mantse of Nungua came into the matter. He had applied to have the default Judgment entered against the Attorney-General as a nominal defendant set aside. The substance of his application was that as the then chief of Nungua, the default Judgment granted ex-parte by Ebiasah J. constituted a challenge to his authority. That because the Judgment injuriously affected him, he on the authority of LAMPTEY VRS

HAMMOND [1987-88] 1 GLR 327 at 328 had the right to have it set aside.

The application was opposed by the plaintiff in whose favour the default Judgment was granted. This application went before the same High Court presided over by R. Asamoah J. (as he then was) about four years after the default Judgment was entered against the Attorney-General.

Asamoah J. on 26-05-2005, granted the application and set aside Ebiasah J.’s Judgment. For convenience and clarity I deem it necessary to reproduce the ruling of Asamoah J. as follows:

“RULING B