NANA YIADOM I v. NANA AMANIAMPONG AND OTHERS

JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.

Apaloo C.J. delivered the ruling of the court. The plaintiff alleges that she is the queenmother of Effiduasi, Ashanti. It is in that right that she brought this action. Her present status has been challenged in the pleadings. She accordingly sought and obtained leave to amend her capacity as "a citizen of Ghana hailing from Ashanti Mampong Traditional Area". In the view that we take of this case, it is not necessary to pronounce on her right to bring this suit.

The first defendant is the paramount chief of Mampong, Ashanti. This is a traditional office of great importance and the holder of such office is held in high esteem by his subjects and strangers alike. But he cannot come by this office unless he has been "nominated, elected and installed in accordance with customary law and usage." Such pre-eminence does the institution of chieftaincy enjoy in our traditional set-up, that it is expressly guaranteed by the Constitution, 1979, art. 177. It is also copiously regulated by legislation. The current statute on chieftaincy, is the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370).

The first defendant was also a director of the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board. While holding that office, he allegedly engaged in certain financial transactions which attracted adverse comment from a committee, i.e. the Archer Committee of Inquiry into the affairs of the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board (the Archer Committee). The first defendant seems to have been aggrieved by the findings of that committee and sought to have them vacated by the special tribunal. Not only was he unsuccessful, but that tribunal proceeded to confirm the adverse findings against him and said "the petitioner (meaning the first defendant) should be disqualified from holding any public office in the country€"

In all probability, it is this holding that provided the motivation for this suit in which the plaintiff seeks to invoke the original jurisdiction of this court and invites us to declare that, "the first defendant has disqualified himself from continuing in office as paramount or any other kind of chief." She also sought other consequential reliefs. It is not necessary to reproduce the consequential reliefs sought by the plaintiff in this ruling but it is sufficient to observe that they can only properly be granted if the first defendant has ceased to be a paramount chief and yet was continuing to hold himself out as such.

It seems plain to us that notwithstanding the way in which the plaint