MENSAH v. MENSAH

JUDGMENT OF HAYFRON-BENJAMIN J.

This is a wife's petition for divorce on the ground that the marriage has broken down beyond the possibility of reconciliation. The parties were married in England on 23 July 1966 and lived and cohabited together there and later on in Accra. Both parties are lawyers, the petitioner presently being a law officer at the office of the Attorney-General. The respondent is a legal practitioner at Accra. There is no issue of the marriage.

The petition itself is just a reproduction of the general provisions of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), and I would not have hesitated to strike it out in its entirety if the respondent had not asked for better particulars. The relevant portions of the petition state:

(7) That the said marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation.

(8) That the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with him.

(9) That the parties to the marriage have after diligent effort been unable to reconcile their differences.

(10) That since 1967 there have been differences between the parties which have remained unresolved and hence contributed to the breakdown of the marriage.

[p.201]

(11) That as a result of the conduct of the respondent complained of and as a result of the failure to reconcile the said differences, the petitioner left the matrimonial home on or about 20 March 1971, has remained separate and apart from the respondent and has not returned since and has no intention of ever resuming cohabitation with respondent.

(12) That there is no possibility of reconciliation between the petitioner and the respondent."

The petitioner for these reasons is asking the court to dissolve the marriage. Before examining the respondent's answer and the evidence in the case, I must remark that the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), may have affected the grounds for divorce, but it has certainly not relaxed the rules of pleading. The general rule stated by Cotton L.J.in Philipps v. Philipps (1878) 4 Q.B.D. 127 at p. 139, C.A. still holds good. He said:

"In my opinion it is absolutely essential that the pleading, not to be embarrassing to the defendants, should state those facts which will put the defendants on their guard and tell them what they have to meet when the case comes on for trial."

Section 2 (2) of Act 367 provides that, "On a petition for divorce it shall be the duty of the court to inquire, so far as is reasonable, into the facts