MARFO v. THE REPUBLIC

JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.

On 13 July 1981, a criminal matter entitled Samuel Marfo v. The Republic was, among other cases, called in the normal course of business of this court. It was an application for bail pending trial of a criminal offence, to wit, fraud by false pretences contrary to the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), s. 132, involving an amount of two thousand cedis (¢2,000). When the case was called one Sarfo Ababio announced himself as the legal representative for the applicant.

He was not one of the legal practitioners with whom I have familiarised myself since I assumed the High Court bench in this jurisdiction. There was nothing of his physiognomy which indicated, even faintly, that he was not a legal practitioner. He had his barrister's wig and robes, and spoke eloquently like any average lawyer would do. Indeed, my research through the roll of lawyers in Ghana, confirmed that he was not a pseudo-barrister. He made an application for bail for Samuel Marfo then standing trial before the District Court Grade I, Tarkwa.

The obvious conclusion I came to was that the trial court had refused bail for the accused. When I read the averments in the affidavit in support of the application, I became satisfied that it evidently disclosed a prima facie case for bail and that there was no apparent good reason for this court to refuse the application. The applicant was prepared to offer security for any recognisance or bond. The trial court had itself seen fit to grant bail but, for no justifiable cause, had rescinded the bail although the applicant had never defaulted in appearing before the court. Section 96 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code 1960 (Act 30), as amended by the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Decree, 1975 (NRCD 309), s. 2 empowers the High Court or circuit court to direct in any case that any person be admitted to bail or that the bail required by a district court or a police officer be reduced, notwithstanding anything in the provisions relating to bail under section 96 (1) of the Act.

In my opinion, subsection (2) gives the High Court or a circuit court very extensive supervisory powers over the district court and the police in matters of bail and I cogitate and even venture to asseverate, that this power can even be exercised by the High Court or the circuit court in an appropriate case suo motu without an application by the accused or his counsel, if the court is informed that bail has been improperly withheld or has been granted upon