July 19, 2006
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
This Supreme Court appeal arises from Ghana Manganese Company Limited’s refusal to re-engage certain employees after a workplace demonstration triggered closure of the mine. Following interventions by the Ministry for Employment and Social Welfare and the National Mineworkers Union, all workers were directed to sign declarations of confidence in management and re-apply; some were reinstated but the appellants were rejected. The company cited a generalized “loss of confidence” and alleged involvement in the demonstration, despite evidence that several appellants were on leave, pregnant, or off shift, and that demonstrators wore masks. The High Court and Court of Appeal dismissed the workers’ claims, but the Supreme Court held the termination wrongful because management failed to follow the collective agreement’s disciplinary and termination procedures and did not give contemporaneous notice or pay in lieu. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside both judgments, awarded damages for wrongful termination, and affirmed dismissal of defamation.
J U D G M E N T
ATUGUBA , J.S.C.
The appellants were employees of the respondent company. Their terms of employment were, inter alia, set out in a collective Bargaining Agreement, exhibit AA.
On the 19th day of May 1999 some of the respondent’s workers went on a demonstration on its premises against the apprehended termination of the employment of the company’s resident doctor. Next day the workers found per notices to that effect, that the company had been closed down. Negotiations ensued between the Ministry for Employment and Social Welfare, representatives of the National Mineworkers Union, the workers and management of respondent. Consequently the appellants and the rest of the workers were asked to sign declarations of confidence in the management as a precondition for “re-adminission”. They did so but were rather issued with letters of rejection. Hence the action.
The appellants’ claims were dismissed both by the trial High Court and the Court of Appeal.
The appellants contend inter alia, that the judgment of the Court of Appeal is against the weight of evidence. It is interesting to note that the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the trial court’s judgment could not be supported on the evidence. What they regarded as the solid legal rock sustaining the appellants’ dismissal is stated at p.239 of the record of appeal per Quaye J.A, as follows: “Even though the respondents did not lead sufficient or satisfactory evidence why the appellants and not any of the other employees had their appointments terminated, they have the legal right qua employers to dispense with any worker and no court can challenge that decision and act once the necessary payments had been made”,
This statement of the law is largely right. What I consider to be trite learning on this issue is that a contract of service is not a contract of servitude. That being so even if the contract of employment is silent on the question whether it is terminable, the common law implies a right to terminate the same by either side upon reasonable notice to the other. See BAUMAN V. HULTDNY PRESS LTD (1952) 2 ALLER 1121. Subject to this the right to terminate a contract of service is dependent on the terms of the contract and must be exercised in accordance there with.
Thus in GHANA COCOA MARKETING BOARD V. AGBETTOH (1984 – 86) 1GLR 122GA at 125 Apaloo C.J delivering the judgment of the court said: “The Plaintiffs were servants of the appellant board (hereinafter referred to as the Defendan