ILLIASU AND ANOTHER v. THE REPUBLIC
July 31, 1968
HIGH COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- EDUSEI J
Areas of Law
- Criminal Law and Procedure
- Evidence Law
July 31, 1968
HIGH COURT
GHANA
CORAM
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JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.
The first appellant was on 2 October 1967 convicted by the Circuit Court, Accra, of the offence of extorting money in the sum of N¢400.00 from one Amina Dagomba by means of threats, contrary to section 151 (1) of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment with hard labour. The second appellant who was a defence witness at the trial of the first appellant was, after the conviction of the first appellant, also convicted of perjury and sentenced to three months' imprisonment with hard labour.
I shall proceed to deal with the case of the second appellant. It is beyond doubt that the circuit judge in convicting the second appellant for perjury was exercising his summary powers under section 152 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30). The learned state attorney at first attempted to support the conviction of this appellant and after addressing his mind to the evidence and the authorities like Commissioner of Police v. Wood (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 71, W.A.C.A.; .R. v. Mensah and Abutakyi (1956) 2 W.A.L.R. 129, W.A.C.A. and R. v. Otubu (1943) 9 W.A.C.A. 20 he capitulated and confessed his inability to support the conviction of the second appellant.
It would also appear from the proceedings that the trial court did not believe the answer the appellant gave. The trial court informed the appellant that "it could not be true that the second prosecution witness had threatened him not to give evidence as it is clear that he had already proffered to give evidence before his name was mentioned in court." The appellant answered that "I came to court because of what the second prosecution witness told me." He was in effect saying that it was true that the second prosecution witness threatened him not to give evidence and it was because of that, that he came to court to give evidence. It has been held in Kwame v. The State [1964] G.L. R. 612 at p. 615, S.C. that:
"The fact that a court does not believe a witness on any particular issue and rejects the evidence of that witness is no proof that what the witness said on the issue is false, and that it is within the knowledge of the witness that what he deposed to is false. If that were so, it would mean that every party who loses a civil or criminal case on facts, and his witness, would be guilty of perjury."
[p.745]
The second appellant's appeal is allowed; he is acquitted and discharged. I now turn my attention to the case of the first appellant who was co
AI Generated Summary
Edusei J adjudicated two linked appeals arising from Circuit Court convictions in Accra. The first appellant had been convicted of extortion for allegedly threatening complainant Amina Dagomba with protective custody to elicit N¢400, purportedly to influence Commissioner of Police Mr. Deku; yet after Special Branch gave Dagomba the money as part of a trap, the threats no longer operated when payment occurred. The judge preferred English authorities that focus on the threat’s effect on a victim’s volition over East African cases emphasizing an accused’s intention, and held that extortion requires actual mental coercion at the time of payment. The second appellant, a defence witness, was summarily convicted of perjury simply because the trial court disbelieved him; applying Kwame v. The State, the judge ruled that disbelief does not prove knowing falsity. Both appeals were allowed, convictions and sentences set aside, and acquittals entered.