JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.
On 23 January 1981, Mr. Ebo Bentsi-Enchill, counsel for the plaintiff herein, filed a motion on notice under Order 59, r. 21 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N.140A). By that motion, this court was called upon to exercise its prerogative, power to commit to prison, one J. K. Addison, the defendant in this suit. The motion accused J. K. Addison of wilful refusal to comply with an order of the court given on 7 March 1980, to file what the applicant described as "proper accounts" in respect of three named persons. According to the applicant, the court fixed one month from the date of the order as the deadline for its compliance. Inasmuch as the defendant defaulted in rendering the "proper accounts," he was, in the opinion of the applicant, guilty of contempt of court and liable to imprisonment. The motion was duly served on the defendant and his solicitor, Mr. Gaisie. The [p.520] latter has raised a preliminary point in law of procedural character. The point consisted of a complaint that the application was incompetent because it was not made in consequence of a prior leave of the court. In other words, the objectioner contended that the grant of leave of the court was a precondition for the institution of contempt proceedings. The buttress for this submission was the explanatory note in the English Annual Practice (The White Book) (1962 ed.), pp. 1742-1743. There was another criticism of the motion. It was argued that the application ought to have been brought under Order 52, rr. 2 and 4.
Needless to point out, Order 52, rr. 2 and 4 when carefully construed, deal with a motion for a rule nisi, an order to show cause, a motion to set aside, remit or enforce an award, or a motion for attachment, and they enjoin applicants to state in general terms, the grounds of their motions. No relevance whatsoever can, in my view, be attached to Order 52, rr. 2 and 4 in resolving the issue that has arisen for determination.
The focal point of the issue is the true construction of Order 59, r. 21. Here, as I have said, the view of Mr. Gaisie diverges sharply from that of Mr. Kweku Brenu for the applicant who argued, in effect, that the prior leave of the court was not required to validate an application for the committal of a person who has disobeyed an order of the court. And he urged the court to subscribe to that view as the true meaning of Order 59, r. 21. The latter rule, draws a sharp distinction between two categories of
