GH - DARKWA v. THE REPUBLIC

JUDGMENT OF CHARLES CRABBE J.S.C.

This appeal is brought pursuant to the provisions of article 198 (2) of the Constitution, 1979. The appellant, a former senior police officer, claims to be dissatisfied with the findings of the committee appointed under the Committee of Inquiry (Recent Disturbances in the Police Force) Instrument, 1979 (EI 38). She has appealed to this court against:

"(a) All adverse findings contained in the report.

(b) The recommendations that:

the appellant be retired;

(ii) the appellant be made to refund the sum of ¢33,867.89."

The reliefs sought from the court are:

"(a) That all the adverse findings and recommendations made against the appellant be set aside.

(b) That the appellant be reinstated."

[p.244]

The grounds upon which these reliefs are sought were originally that:

"The committee erred in holding the appellant responsible for 30 per centum of the sum ¢106,513.00, which sum was, by statute, authorised to be deducted in pursuance of the provisions of the Cedi (New Notes) Decree, 1979 (S.M.C.D. 226)."

Before this court, counsel for the appellant argued that all the proceedings of the committee of inquiry were nugatory and therefore null and void. This was so because the committee failed to perform its statutory duty as imposed upon it by EI 38 of 1979. The committee was enjoined to "investigate" and "inquire." Investigate and inquire were synonymous.

It was a rule of statutory interpretation that whenever those words were used, then a duty was imposed to observe the rules of natural justice. Counsel cited in support, Halsbury's Laws of England (4th ed.), Vol. 1, p. 77, para. 65; Memudu Lagungu v. Olubadan-in-Council [1952] 1 T.L.R. 1297 at p. 1303, P.C., decided on the Appointments of Chiefs Ordinance, 1948, and Leesons v. General Council of Medical Education and Registration [1886-90] All E.R. Rep. 78 at p. 85, C.A.

These authorities had laid down the proposition that there was the duty on the committee to observe the rules of natural justice, to conduct a "due inquiry," to afford those concerned a full opportunity of being heard. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, it was imperative that the appellant be given a chance to confront her accusers, to give her version of the matter, more so as the findings might result in a "prosecution in court, dismissal, removal, retirement or reduction in rank" as stated in paragraph 10 of EI 38 of 1979.

Counsel contended that the committee was completely aware of