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July 14, 1972
HIGH COURT
GHANA
CORAM
JUDGMENT OF ATA-BEDU J.
This is an application for bail pending appeal by the applicants who were on 5 June 1972 convicted on two charges of forcible entry by his worship D. K. Okyere sitting as Magistrate Grade 1 at Hohoe and were each sentenced to a term of nine months' imprisonment with hard labour.
The substance of the charges against the applicants is that, armed with cutlasses and clubs, they entered the cottages of the first prosecution witness and the second prosecution witness, set fire to the kitchen of the second prosecution witness's tenant, Subulegah, and to the second prosecution witness's mattress and firewood, removed the roofing sheets from the second prosecution witness's kitchen, destroyed cooking pots and a snare and carried away her iron pot, table and fowls. At the cottage of the first prosecution witness they ordered her to pack all her goods and leave without questioning and demanding reasons for such an order; the first prosecution witness complied with the order and left. The summary of the evidence contained in the judgment reveals that the first and the second prosecution witnesses acquired the land by purchase.
Against their convictions the applicants filed their petition on 6 June 1972, in which the only ground of appeal urged, pending the filing of additional grounds, is that, "The verdict is unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence."
The power to grant bail to a convicted person pending his appeal is contained in section 26 (5) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), which provides as follows:
"The Court before which a person is convicted or the Court to which an appeal is made may if it thinks fit on the application of an appellant admit the appellant to bail pending the determination of his appeal."
[p.355]
Section 332 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), which similarly empowers the High Court to grant bail reads as follows:
"After the filing of a petition of appeal by any person entitled to appeal, and pending the hearing, the High Court may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of a sentence or order appealed against be suspended and also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond."
From these provisions it is quite obvious that the grant of bail to convicted persons is not automatic but discretionary. It is a course which is unusual but which may be taken in exceptional circumstances considering the principle th
AI Generated Summary
ATA-BEDU J. of the High Court considered an application for bail pending appeal by persons convicted on 5 June 1972 by Magistrate Grade 1 D. K. Okyere at Hohoe of two counts of forcible entry and sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment with hard labour. The charges described violent entry into cottages, destruction of property, and removal of goods; the judgment recorded that the prosecution witnesses had purchased the land. The applicants petitioned on 6 June 1972, challenging the verdict as unreasonable. The court reviewed statutory bases—section 26(5) of the Courts Act, 1971 and section 332(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code—and appellate principles from Ghanaian and English authorities, emphasizing discretion, exceptional circumstances, undue delay relative to sentence, prima facie error, and necessity to assist counsel. Finding the affidavit’s assertions unsupported by specific references and no evidence of undue delay, with only one month served and the record being short, the court refused bail, noting a fresh application could be made if delay became unreasonable.