ARTHUR v. THE REPUBLIC
December 15, 1972
COURT OF APPEAL
CORAM
- AZU CRABBE AG.C.J.
- JIAGGE
- KINGSLEY-NYINAH JJ.A
Areas of Law
- Criminal Law and Procedure
- Civil Procedure
December 15, 1972
COURT OF APPEAL
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
This ruling by Azu Crabbe Ag.C.J., with Jiagge and Kingsley-Nyinah JJ.A concurring, addresses an application to re-enter a criminal appeal dismissed when the appellant failed to appear. The applicant had been convicted at the High Court in Accra on eight counts of extortion and sentenced to twelve months’ hard labour on each count. He appealed and was released on bail, but the appeal was dismissed on 16 October 1972 due to his absence, and he was later arrested. The application sought re-entry so the appeal could be heard on the merits. The court noted Part III of the Supreme Court Rules lacked a provision akin to rule 23(2) for civil appeals but emphasized its inherent jurisdiction to do substantial justice, particularly where liberty is at stake. Considering the affidavit explaining the non-appearance, the court exercised its discretion and ordered that the appeal be re-entered for hearing.
JUDGMENT OF AZU CRABBE AG.C.J.
Azu Crabbe Ag.C.J. delivered the ruling of the court. The applicant was convicted at the High Court, Accra, on 28 April 1970, upon an [p.206] indictment containing eight counts charging him with extortion and was sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment with hard labour on each count. On 30 April he filed an appeal against his conviction, and was subsequently released on bail pending the hearing and determination of the appeal. The appeal was listed for hearing on 16 October 1972, but on that day the applicant failed to attend the court, and his appeal was therefore dismissed and an order was made for his arrest and and imprisonment. On 10 November 1972, the applicant was arrested on warrant and taken to prison to serve his sentence of imprisonment.
The present application is for an order that the appeal by the applicant be re-entered for hearing, and the grounds, upon which the application is founded, are set out in the following relevant paragraphs of an affidavit by the eldest son of the applicant:
"(3) The appellant and I as his eldest son who had been concerned about the fate of the appeal were waiting to receive a notice from the court that the appeal had been fixed for hearing on a particular date.
(4) We were both unaware that we should watch the Ghana Gazette for publication of the appeal as having been listed for hearing nor did we know that we should watch the notice board of the Court of Appeal in the law courts building to find out when the appeal would come on for hearing.
(5) We did not even know that the record of appeal was ready and that we should collect our copy upon payment of the necessary fees.
(6) Such was the state of affairs until 10 November 1972 when two policemen appeared at our house with a warrant to arrest my father on the ground that his appeal had been called on 16 October 1972, and he being absent, the appeal had been dismissed and so an order had been made for his arrest and imprisonment.
(7) My father, to the best of my knowledge, information and belief has been anxious to prosecute this appeal and it is only because of the matters set out above that neither he nor a legal practitioner representing him was present in court when the appeal was called.
(8) In the circumstances on the instructions of my father the appellant who is an old man in his seventies, I swear to this affidavit praying the court to exercise its discretion to order that the appeal be re-entered for hearing on