AKUFO-ADDO AND OTHERS v. QUARSHIE IDUN AND OTHERS
July 22, 1968
COURT OF APPEAL
CORAM
- AMISSAH J.A.
- KINGSLEY-NYINAH
- ARCHER
- BAIDOO
- ANNAN JJ
Areas of Law
- Administrative Law
- Civil Procedure
- Tax Law
July 22, 1968
COURT OF APPEAL
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
Three Ghanaian lawyers sued the Chief Justice, the Judicial Secretary, and the General Legal Council, alleging that circulars issued to judges and magistrates denied them audience unless they appeared on a licence list or produced a solicitor’s licence. They sought declaratory relief and an interim injunction. Anterkyi J. granted wide interlocutory relief against the Chief Justice and Judicial Secretary, but not the General Legal Council. On appeal, the Court of Appeal, per Amissah J.A., rejected bench-composition objections under the Courts Decree and applied statutory necessity, holding that the Chief Justice could constitute the bench and that a full bench had concurrent appellate jurisdiction. Addressing the merits, the Court held that section 13(2) of the State Proceedings Act bars injunctions whose effect restrains the Republic, emphasized the Income Tax Decree’s registration regime for “lawyers in private practice,” criticized the trial judge’s nonjudicial discretion, and set aside the interim order. Appeal allowed.
JUDGMENT OF AMISSAH J.A.
Amissah J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. This is an appeal from a decision of Anterkyi J. granting an interim injunction against some of the defendants in this action. The three plaintiffs, each of whom is a lawyer of considerable standing in the community, sued the Chief Justice, the Judicial Secretary and the General Legal Council. The plaintiffs complained that through the conduct of the defendants, namely, by the issue of certain circulars to judicial officers they had been denied their right of audience as barristers in the courts. They therefore sought a declaration of that right together with an injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering with its exercise. After issuing their writ and filing their statement of claim the plaintiffs made the application for the interim injunction. Argument having been heard, the learned judge gave a considered ruling in which he concluded that:
"In the result the application for an order of interim injunction succeeds as against each of the first and second defendants in his personal capacity or in any official capacity, whatsoever, and I therefore hereby make an order restraining those defendants from avoiding or declaring void in any manner whatsoever [p.671] the status of each of the plaintiffs as a barrister and his consequent right of audience in all the courts and commissions of inquiry sitting in the State of Ghana, and also restraining each of the first and second defendants from taking any steps for that purpose, or from in any way interfering with the exercise by each plaintiff of his rights or privileges incident to his right as a barrister until trial or further action."
In at least one respect the order was much wider than the relief asked for. The plaintiffs had complained of the defendants' action in their official capacities and had asked for the temporary restraint to be placed on them in those capacities. The order covered both their official and personal capacities. Yet in another respect the order was narrower than the relief requested. The plaintiffs asked that all three defendants be restrained. The order restrained only the first defendant, the Chief Justice and the second defendant, the Judicial Secretary. The third defendant, the General Legal Council upon whose authority the other defendants had, according to the parties themselves, acted, was left unrestrained. The considerations which led to the grant of the order in this form will be more