MacLeod v Mears Ltd
2014
QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION
United Kingdom
CORAM
- MR JUSTICE HAMBLEN
Areas of Law
- Contract Law
- Employment Law
2014
QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION
United Kingdom
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
Mr. Macleod claimed over £2 million from his former employer, Mears, under a disputed profit-sharing bonus agreement. The court addressed key issues regarding the existence and terms of the agreement, including whether it was binding, team or individual bonuses, applicable periods, bonus caps, and subsequent variations. The court found that the bonus agreement was binding, applied to teams, was applicable until December 2008, and included no bonus cap. No subsequent variations were proven.
JUDGMENT
CONSEQUENTIAL RULING
Mr Justice Hamblen :
Introduction
This is the hearing of matters consequential upon my judgment handed down on 8 th July 2014. The relevant background is set out in the judgment. The Claimant, Mr Macleod, made a claim against his former employer, Mears Ltd, for some £2 million which he contended to be due to him under a profit sharing bonus agreement.
A split trial had been ordered and the trial in June concerned liability only. The principal issues which arose were (1) whether a binding agreement was made; (2) the terms of any such agreement, and (3) whether it was varied or superseded.
As set out in my conclusions at paragraph 96 of the judgment I found that:
“The T/A and accompanying documents involve a contractually binding bonus agreement.
The bonus agreed was for Mr Webb’s and Mr Macleod’s teams rather than for them individually.
The allocation of 75p in the pound only applied until April 2008.
The agreed terms were only applicable until December 2008.
The agreement did not include a bonus cap.
The agreement was not subsequently varied or superseded.”
During the course of the judgment I found that, contrary to the defendant’s case, there was a contractual agreement made but that, contrary to the claimant’s case, the agreement was that a bonus would be provided to the claimant’s team rather than to him personally.
In paragraphs 52-54 of judgment I said as follows:
“52. For all these reasons, and those given by Mears, I conclude and find that the bonus agreed in the T/A was a pooled bonus for the benefit of Mr Webb and Mr Macleod’s teams, and not an individual bonus.
53. Mears submitted that this shows that T/A was not meant to be contractual. It did not confer a personal entitlement; it simply set out the arrangements for the calculation of pool bonuses. However, in my judgment the approval of the T/A was intended to have and did have contractual effect. That is clearly the case in relation to Mr Webb and Mr Macleod being Grade 8 employees, the benefits conferred thereby and their salary. An entitlement to claim a share of a specified bonus pool is a recognised right, even if distribution is discretionary. Further, Mr Miles accepted in evidence that Mears was bound by the agreement he had made and would keep its promises.
54. Mears further submitted that this is not how the claim has been advanced and that the sole claim made is for a specified sum due personally. There is some force in this but that do